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# **TRENDS**

**In Communist Propaganda**

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11 JUNE 1975

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GOVORUZ  
ABSTRENDS

11 JUNE 1975

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## MIDDLE EAST

## USSR-EGYPT DISCORD REFLECTED IN REOPENING OF SUEZ CANAL

Soviet comment on the 5 June reopening of the Suez Canal has been notable chiefly for its indications of continued friction in Soviet-Egyptian relations. As might be expected on such an occasion, most of the comment was correctly favorable but stereotyped, stressing prospective economic benefits for all countries affected and praising Egypt for having made a "peace-inspired" decision. In discussing the economic aspects, however, one Moscow commentator made the point that Egypt now has a new source of income and will be able to repay its foreign debts instead of requesting their postponement--a subject which President as-Sadat has repeatedly cited as a persistent sore point in Soviet-Egyptian relations. As for the political implications, Moscow has been ambivalent, welcoming the Egyptian move but asserting that Israel and the United States consider Egypt ready to make further concessions, and intimating that Cairo would not be averse to a new Israeli-Egyptian bilateral agreement. Moscow has played down the issue of the military importance of the canal, dismissing the notion that the Soviet navy would gain special advantages.

CEREMONIAL REOPENING      Moscow's distinctly low-keyed and limited reportage on the ceremonies marking the official reopening of the canal implicitly conveyed Soviet annoyance over Egypt's gesture of inviting the flagship of the U.S. Sixth Fleet to participate as the only foreign warship in the flotilla. Reporting the ceremonies on the 5th, TASS glossed over the U.S. presence, stating only that "a convoy of several warships, carrying the Egyptian Government's guests of honor, sailed along the canal from Port Said to Suez." TASS also noted that two hours later "the first merchantmen, flying the flags of various states," followed.

A Yu. Senkov commentary carried by Moscow radio's Arabic service on the 5th attempted to highlight a Soviet presence by pointing out that "among the first convoy of ships passing through the Suez Canal are two Soviet ships." Senkov added that 20 Soviet ships were expected to transit the canal from the north in a few days, while seven more were anchored in Suez waiting to sail north. He quoted a canal official as saying that Egypt was "pleased to greet the Soviet ships which were at the head of the ships passing through the Suez Canal." In the only available reference to a Soviet delegation attending the ceremonies, Senkov mentioned that

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the deputy minister of the Soviet maritime fleet, heading the Soviet delegation, called the reopening an important international event helping the growth of world navigation.

Part of Moscow's resentment appeared due to Egypt's lack of sufficient appreciation for Soviet efforts to help clear the canal of mines. Moscow's occasional comment in past months on the status of the canal had typically focused on the continuing efforts of the Soviet naval units assigned to such duty. TASS on 5 June emphatically praised the Soviet sailors for their "very important, dangerous, and extremely responsible" work, stressing that it was carried out in the Red Sea climate "with its heat and sandstorms" to which the sailors were "totally unaccustomed" and under which they "had to work 12-14 hours a day" over a four-month period. Other Soviet comment emphasized that preparation for the canal's reopening was long and arduous work, occasionally mentioning that other nations' navies were involved, but generally singling out the Soviet effort in mine-sweeping a large area in the Gulf of Suez.

ECONOMIC ASPECTS      One clear sign of persistent Soviet-Egyptian discord was Moscow's use of the canal reopening as an occasion for touching on the sore point of Egypt's debt repayments. Moscow has tended to avoid this question; thus, Soviet coverage of Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi's 19-22 April visit to Moscow ignored the aspect of debt rescheduling, although Fahmi was reported by Cairo media as having said after the talks that this was one of "several issues" remaining to be solved.\*

In an Arabic-language broadcast on 5 June, Mideast specialist Pavel Demchenko sounded a sour note when he suggested Egypt's income from the canal would help to alleviate its "many financial difficulties." These difficulties, he said, had forced Cairo "to seek financial aid from the oil-producing countries and the postponement of repayment of foreign debts." Demchenko pointedly predicted that the "emergence of a new and large source of income in hard currency" would improve Egypt's economic situation. Less explicitly, a V. Shmarov article in the newspaper SOCIALIST INDUSTRY on the 5th emphasized Egypt's economic benefits from the canal, remarking that "great hopes for the strengthening of the country's budget are connected with navigation."

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\* Fahmi's visit is discussed in the 23 April 1975 TRENDS, pages 8-12.

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POLITICAL  
IMPLICATIONS

Moscow appears to view the reopening of the canal with mixed feelings. On the one hand, comment has welcomed the move as a show of Egyptian good will in the quest for a Mideast settlement, creating "additional prerequisites" for resumption of the Geneva peace conference and showing Cairo's readiness for a comprehensive settlement. On the other hand, Moscow has conveyed its suspicion that the Egyptian action--and Israel's "symbolic" reduction of forces on the Sinai front--indicate that Egypt and Israel are interested in returning to the step-by-step process of "partial agreements."

The tone of present comment is reminiscent of that beginning in 1971, after President as-Sadat in February of that year had set forth a proposal for reopening the canal. Soviet commentators subsequently charged that the United States, in an "American variant" of the idea, tried to isolate the canal issue from an overall settlement. Just as Moscow has been objecting for months to the current U.S. diplomatic approach of "partial steps," commentators then complained of American suggestions for "so-called interim agreements"--such as an agreement on reopening the canal--which would "freeze" settlement of the main problem, that of Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory.

In current comment, Demchenko, in the 5 June Arabic-language broadcast, implied that the canal reopening was not uniformly regarded in the Arab world as the correct decision, noting that "some Arab papers" suggested that the canal should remain closed as a means of influencing various countries particularly in Western Europe, to pressure Israel. Demchenko went on to observe that "some Egyptian quarters" regarded the reopening of the canal as a step in the interests of peace which "will be met by a certain step by Israel," and he expressed his doubt that this was a valid conclusion.\*

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\* Cairo's AL-AHRAM on the 11th, according to the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, declared that the whole world, including the United States, realized that "a second disengagement east of the canal has become a necessity" following the reopening of the canal. The paper added that Egypt could not be expected to respond to any Israeli attempt "to separate this partial agreement from a comprehensive settlement" or to link Sinai disengagement to a time schedule divorced from efforts to achieve an overall solution.

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Taking a slightly different tack, a Timoshkin commentary broadcast in Arabic on the 6th pointed to "tendentious attempts" by Israel and "its protectors" to exploit the reopening of the canal to depict Egypt as ready to make concessions to the "aggressors." Timoshkin noted that Israeli Prime Minister Rabin had said there were "favorable conditions for temporary partial agreements" with Egypt and had ordered a "symbolic reduction" of forces in Sinai. Also criticizing Israel's action as of no practical military significance, Sergey Losev pointed out in SOVIET RUSSIA on the 6th that the Israeli army still held Sharm ash-Shaykh, enabling Israel "to block at any time navigation in the southern sector" of the canal. Losev assessed the Israeli move as aimed at "resuming the 'small steps' tactics" so as to prolong occupation of Arab territories. Similarly, a Timoshkin PRAVDA article reported in a Moscow Arabic-language broadcast on the 10th claimed that Israel was again trying to "impose the degrading tactics of a partial settlement" on Egypt. Timoshkin cited the Washington POST as reporting Israeli proposals for "a number of successive small steps" which would take "several years" to complete.

ISRAELI CARGO,  
SHIP PASSAGE

Soviet coverage of the canal reopening did not touch on the issue of passage for Israeli cargo or ships, a subject Moscow has mentioned only infrequently. TASS on 30 March, reporting as-Sadat's People's Assembly address the previous day in which he announced his decision on reopening the canal, cited the Egyptian information minister as declaring that Israeli ships would not be allowed to use the canal until an overall settlement of the Mideast problem was reached. An Arabic-language commentary by A. Timoshkin on 11 April argued that resumption of navigation in the canal was likely to promote the practical efforts being made toward a Mideast settlement, and that Israel therefore was trying to make the question of reopening the canal into an issue for political bargaining. Tel Aviv, Timoshkin said, called for agreement for foreign ships to carry goods to Israel through the canal, but "naturally" Egypt rejected this unacceptable demand. Timoshkin conjectured that Israel "resorted again" to this demand in an effort to revive Kissinger's "policy of quiet diplomacy." In late May Mideast specialist Belyayev, in an IZVESTIYA article on the 29th, noted that Israel's "important political conditions" in the March round of Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy included a demand "that Egypt consent unconditionally to the passage of cargoes for Israel through the Suez Canal on third-country ships."

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Moscow apparently has not taken note of the Israeli contention, reiterated by Foreign Minister Allon in a 4 June Knesset statement, that Egypt undertook a commitment to freedom of passage for Israeli cargoes "at the time the forces disengagement agreement was signed" in January 1974. President as-Sadat had remarked ambiguously, in a New York TIMES interview reported by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY on 13 April, that the United States "informed us of the problem of Israeli goods at the time of ratification" of the first disengagement agreement, and "our stand has not changed from what we conveyed to Dr. Kissinger then." As-Sadat added that "we will discuss this problem" within the framework of the peace efforts. Most recently as-Sadat told correspondents during the ceremonial canal reopening voyage, according to Cairo radio on 5 June, that the question of cargoes "will depend on Israel's behavior," adding that "I have said that the passage of goods does not constitute a problem."

On the passage of Israeli ships, as-Sadat reiterated his standard argument that this was a different matter: It was banned under the Constantinople Convention of 1888, as long as Egypt and Israel were in a state of war. In fact, Article I of the 1888 Convention says that the canal "shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag." Egypt perhaps bases its position on Article X, which says that provisions of Articles IV, V, VII, and VIII--but not Article I--"shall not stand in the way of any measures" which the Sultan and the Khedive "might find it necessary to take to assure by their own forces the defense of Egypt and the maintenance of public order."

BACKGROUND: Moscow, in NEW TIMES articles in February and March 1970 discussing the Soviet proposals for a Mideast settlement, said that the USSR proceeded from the need to establish the principle of freedom of passage through the Suez Canal for ships of all countries without discrimination, "in accordance with the 1888 Constantinople Convention." A year earlier, Mideast specialist Belyayev, in an INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS article in May 1969, said there were no objections to Israel making use of the canal but that this was made "impossible" by the state of war existing between Egypt and Israel. He claimed that certain precedents had been established during World War II to the "universal right to use the Suez Canal," when Britain deprived Germany of this right, and argued that Egypt was justified in taking similar action. In the only known instance in which Moscow echoed as-Sadat's position, an Arabic-language broadcast of the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress on 24 May 1974 asserted that freedom of navigation in the canal was governed by the Constantinople Convention, "which provides for a ban on ships of a country in a state of war with Egypt."

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## VIETNAM

Hanoi propaganda in the past week was highlighted by attention to the 3-6 June session of the DRV National Assembly which elected new government officials and heard a major report by Premier Pham Van Dong and a comprehensive foreign policy report by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh. In his 4 June report, Trinh reiterated that Hanoi would continue to honor its obligations under the Paris agreement but, for the first time, added that provisions of the agreement which are "no longer consistent" with the situation in South Vietnam are "ipso facto ineffective." Trinh advocated the settlement of outstanding problems between the United States and the DRV and offered to hold talks with the United States to accomplish this. He also stressed Hanoi's intention to expand its relations and cooperation with other Southeast Asian nations.

### DRV FOREIGN MINISTER'S ASSEMBLY REPORT URGES U.S.-DRV TALKS

Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh in his report on the 4th echoed Premier Pham Van Dong's offer the day before to normalize relations with the United States. However, in setting forth the conditions, Trinh failed to reiterate Pham Van Dong's assertion that only the "spirit" of the Paris agreement need be implemented with regard to the U.S. "obligation" to contribute to postwar Vietnam reconstruction.\* Instead the foreign minister hewed to the more conventional DRV line that would require U.S. observance of "all the basic principles" of the Paris agreement.

In other respects Foreign Minister Trinh's report seemed calculated to appear forthcoming toward the United States. In particular, he took the initiative to urge direct U.S.-DRV talks to resolve "all the sequels of war concerning Vietnam and the United States." Thus, Trinh declared: "The DRV government is ready to discuss" with the U.S. Government such questions as U.S. help in "healing the wounds of war in both zones of Vietnam, the search for Americans missing in action, as well as the exhumation and repatriation of the remains of Americans killed in the war." Trinh maintained that all these "pending problems" need to be settled "soon."

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\* For a discussion of Premier Dong's presentation of the conditions necessary for improving relations, see the TRENDS of 4 June 1975, pages 12-13.

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U.S.-DRV TALKS      Hanoi is last previously known to have raised the question of U.S.-DRV talks in a 27 January 1975 foreign minister's note on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Paris agreement. The note observed that "throughout the past two years, the path of contacts and talks has remained open, but the U.S. Government has done nothing but sabotage the Paris agreement with increasing impudence."

The possibility of consultations between the two sides was not raised by Foreign Minister Trinh in his December 1974 National Assembly report or in his 21 January 1975 letter, released by Hanoi on 16 March, in reply to a letter from Senator Edward Kennedy requesting additional information on U.S. missing personnel. In the letter Trinh made the unusual disclosure that the DRV was taking positive action to find missing Americans, noting that "the DRV services responsible for getting information about those considered missing in action continue their efforts in the hope that their work will help to ease the anguish of the families of those still considered missing." Trinh went on to directly link Hanoi's demands for an end to U.S. military aid to Thieu with the possibility of progress on the question of the MIA's, noting that such a U.S. action would have a "positive effect" on the implementation of the provisions of the Paris agreement on the missing in action.\*

The offer of U.S.-DRV talks in Trinh's 4 June National Assembly report was reiterated in a 10 June Hanoi radio commentary and commentaries the following day in the North Vietnamese party paper NHAN DAN and the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. All three commentaries opened with criticism of U.S. Department of State spokesman Anderson's 4 June press conference remarks scoring DRV violations of the Paris agreement. They did not acknowledge, however, that Anderson was responding to questions about the U.S. position on normalization of U.S.-DRV relations in the wake of Premier Pham Van Dong's reference to such a possibility.

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\* In an obvious move to establish Hanoi's good faith concerning the missing in action, VNA on 22 April transmitted the names and vital statistics of three U.S. pilots killed in North Vietnam. Recalling Foreign Minister Trinh's words, VNA reported that the information was being released in line with the "goodwill and humanitarian policy" enunciated in Trinh's letter to Senator Kennedy.

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All three commentaries maintained that the end of the war had created conditions for the resolution of outstanding U.S.-DRV problems. Like Trinh they listed these problems as encompassing the question of U.S. aid to Vietnam as well as the issues of U.S. missing in action and the repatriation of the remains of Americans who died in Vietnam. Recalling the Trinh offer of discussions with Washington, the radio and NHAN DAN added that the DRV had demonstrated its "seriousness and goodwill" and that "everything now depends on the U.S. attitude." They added that if the United States continued its "slanderous allegations," seizure of airplanes, ships and other Vietnamese property, and its trade embargo, then it must assume responsibility for the situation.

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### HANOI ADVOCATES COOPERATION WITH SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES

In the wake of the Vietnam war Hanoi has shown its desire to expand its influence and strengthen its ties with neighboring countries in Southeast Asia. North Vietnamese public statements have portrayed the situation in Southeast Asia as undergoing dramatic changes as a result of the communist victory in Vietnam, with the United States retreating from the area and Southeast Asian nations disengaging from their alignments with Washington. In this context, authoritative Hanoi spokesmen have affirmed North Vietnam's intention to seek better relations with its neighbors, and Hanoi has pressed forward in efforts to "normalize" relations with Thailand. Consistent with this stance, Hanoi offers customary support for the world revolutionary struggle but takes care not to specifically encourage Southeast Asian armed insurgents.

COMMENT ON Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh's foreign  
SOUTHEAST ASIA policy report to the DRV National Assembly on  
4 June provided the most comprehensive statement  
of North Vietnamese policy toward Southeast Asia since the end of  
the war. As summarized by VNA, Trinh's report echoed earlier media  
comment in its optimistic assessment that the Vietnamese communist  
victory had "tipped the power balance in favor of the revolutionary  
forces in this part of the world" and "greatly encouraged the  
revolutionary movement in Southeast Asia, and the trend of peace,  
independence, and neutrality" in the region. Trinh pledged that  
the DRV would "strengthen its relations with the countries in  
Southeast Asia, and step by step organize economic and cultural  
exchanges according to the principles of mutual respect for each  
other's independence and sovereignty, noninterference in each  
other's internal affairs, equality, and mutual benefit."

Pham Van Dong in his 3 June National Assembly report also promised adherence to "our stand of tightening our friendship and good neighborliness with the other Southeast Asian countries and developing our relations of multifaceted cooperation with these countries on the basis of respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, equality, mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence." And a general reference to North Vietnam's regional ties had been voiced by Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) First Secretary Le Duan in his 15 May speech at a Hanoi victory rally, when he promised that the DRV would "persist" in its policy of "strengthening solidarity and friendship with our neighbors in Southeast Asia."

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North Vietnam's optimistic appraisal of recent developments in Southeast Asia has been spelled out in more detail in the Hanoi press, in particular in an editorial pegged to Le Duan's remarks in the 21 May issue of the party paper NHAN DAN and in commentaries in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 28 May and 8 June. The NHAN DAN editorial heralded a "rare opportunity" for the free and independent development of Southeast Asian nations and indicated approval of previous proposals for the neutralization of the region made by ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) member spokesmen and recent statements by "many governments" about national sovereignty and their intention to revise their military alliances with the United States.

The 28 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary was even more ebullient in its description of the "very great revolutionary change" in Southeast Asia in the wake of the Vietnam war, claiming that the war had "forced America to accept a basic retreat" in the area. It also warned, however, that Washington was not resigned to total defeat. Apparently responding to critics of aggressive Vietnamese communist strategies, the army paper also maintained that the communist victory was proof of the "offensive posture of the world revolutionary movement" and added that: "The offensive strategy has defeated the compromise and negative strategies."

The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on 8 June, pegged to Assistant Secretary of State Habib's Southeast Asian tour, claimed that Habib had gone to the area in an effort to perpetuate the U.S. position and influence and to stem the "trend of many countries . . . toward independence, peace, and neutrality and detachment from the U.S. orbit." Maintaining that Habib had failed to achieve his aims, the paper portrayed the leadership in Indonesia and the Philippines as moving away from pro-U.S. positions under the pressure of the "people" or "progressive strata." In addition, the commentary claimed that U.S.-Thai relations "are tending to deteriorate" and that in Singapore and Malaysia Habib "admitted that there is a procommunist trend developing in the member nations of the U.S.-directed ASEAN." The paper concluded that the "peoples" of the area are demanding a U.S. withdrawal and "establishment of friendly relations with neighboring countries" and that "Asian ruling circles have clearly realized that to blindly engage in the anticomunist road and to continue to tail after U.S. imperialism is an unwise act which will only bring them misfortune."

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Other Hanoi propaganda, like the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary, has extolled the role of the Southeast Asian "people" in opposing the U.S. presence in the area and pressuring their governments to loosen their ties with Washington, but media comment has not gone on to endorse armed insurgents attempting to overthrow these regimes. In fact, Trinh's Assembly report suggested increased Hanoi confidence that its immediate objectives in Southeast Asia could be best served by working with the regimes in power. Thus, Trinh endorsed the struggle of Southeast Asian "countries" for peace, independence, and neutrality, rather than repeating the formula he had used in his December 1974 National Assembly speech and on other occasions--a formula supporting the struggle of the Southeast Asian "people" for these goals.

## DRV-THAI RELATIONS

Steps taken by Hanoi since the end of the war to improve relations with Thailand

are the most visible public manifestation of Hanoi's avowed interest in improving its ties with its Southeast Asian neighbors. Talks were held in Bangkok between representatives of the two governments from 21 to 29 May, and agreement was reached for Bangkok to send a delegation to Hanoi in the future to continue the consultations. Hanoi's initiative with Bangkok is consistent with positive North Vietnamese public statements about the Thai Government in 1974 and the policy of improving relations set forth by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh in letters to the Thai Foreign Minister at the end of November 1974 and on 25 January 1975.\* The second Trinh letter had indicated that DRV-Thai talks on normalizing relations could be held if Bangkok would take "practical actions" to demonstrate that it wanted friendly relations.

There has been only limited North Vietnamese propaganda attention to the recent contacts with the Bangkok Government, with the most authoritative comment contained in a 7 June NHAN DAN article under the authoritative byline "Commentator." Hanoi media first mentioned the bilateral talks in Bangkok when the departure of the DRV delegation was announced on 20 May. (The delegation was led by DRV Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Phan Kien, a former member of the DRV delegation at the Paris peace talks, and included Vu Hoang, who had led a DRV delegation to Bangkok in September 1970 to discuss repatriation of Vietnamese refugees.) There were brief Hanoi news reports on the activities of the delegation in Bangkok,

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\* For background on the question of Thai-DRV relations, see the 20 March 1975 FBIS SPECIAL REPORT No. 309, "North Vietnamese Relations With Thailand: Evolution of DRV Policy Since the Paris Peace Agreement."

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and Hanoi media carried the 29 May joint DRV-Thai communique on the talks which noted that the talks had covered "problems of common interest" and were aimed at "reaching an agreement on normalization of relations." Without indicating the substance of the discussion, the communique noted agreement was reached on "many issues" but that "several other important problems remain to be discussed" and that "with this in mind, the Thai delegation has accepted the DRV's invitation to visit Hanoi" at a date to be set later. The absence of details on the talks was explained by Thai Foreign Minister Chatichai Chunhawan in a 27 May press conference: he reported that the two sides had agreed not to comment on the substance of the talks until all negotiations were completed and relations established.

The 7 June NHAN DAN Commentator article seemed to reflect considerable circumspection about the policies of the Thai Government. While not directly criticizing Bangkok authorities, neither did it give them credit for requiring the reduction of U.S. military forces in Thailand, instead labeling the U.S. withdrawal of men and planes and the promise to remove all military forces by May 1976 as "victories for the Thai people." In speaking of the bilateral talks in Bangkok, Commentator said only that the Thai side had "made certain efforts" and characterized the atmosphere of the talks as "frank." The article maintained that it was "entirely possible to resolve the remaining problems and normalize relations," but that the Thai Government must recognize the demands of the Thai people, "clearly realize the great changes in Southeast Asia," be determined to implement a policy of peace, independence, and "true" neutrality, and "definitely separate" from America's "neocolonialist policy."

Hanoi's cautious appraisal of the situation in Thailand was also reflected in Commentator's explanation that the new "positive tendency" in Southeast Asia was taking place "at different levels and in different forms" in Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries. Commentator also observed that since the overthrow of the military regime in Thailand in October 1973, Thailand had shown "initial transformations" in response to the aspirations of the people, but that there was also "opposition between the people and the national democratic forces on the one hand and, on the other hand, the reactionary forces who still want to maintain Thailand's dependency upon America."

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## DRV NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS RETAIN TOP GOVERNMENT LEADERS

In conformity with the provisions of the DRV constitution, the first session of the Fifth National Assembly has elected a new Council of Ministers and made certain personnel changes in various other governmental bodies under its jurisdiction. For the most part the reshuffling has been minor, with most of the top regime leaders retaining their former positions or positions of equivalent influence. The most obvious organization change has been the abolition of the Ministry of Security and the creation of a Ministry of War Invalids and Social Affairs, a move that may have been made in anticipation of the peacetime problems that Hanoi foresees.

According to a 5 June Hanoi radio broadcast reporting the initial results of the Assembly balloting, the DRV presidency and vice presidency were retained by Ton Duc Thang and Nguyen Luong Bang, respectively, and Truong Chinh was reelected chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee—a post to which he was first elected in July 1960. The Standing Committee's previous vice chairman were all reconfirmed, and Xuan Thuy was added to the list as a new vice chairman. Standing Committee Vice Chairman Hoang Van Hoan, who was chosen to serve concurrently as the committee's secretary general at the fourth session of the Fourth National Assembly in February 1974, was replaced in that post by Vice Chairman Chu Van Tan.

The top leadership lineup of the Council of Ministers was reaffirmed in its entirety. According to a 6 June communique issued by the Assembly session, Pham Van Dong was reelected premier and the list of vice premiers conformed to the one issued in June 1971 at the conclusion of the Fourth National Assembly's first session.\* Also included in the latest roster were the same three new vice premiers appointed by an April 1974 Standing Committee communique that gave them supervisory responsibilities over broadly based new economic "blocks" that were apparently created to provide high-level guidance over specific sectors of the North Vietnam economy.\*\* There was no indication in the current Assembly communique or in any of its proceedings whether these new functions have been continued or done away with.

\* For a discussion of personnel changes announced at the opening session of the last National Assembly, see the TRENDS of 16 June 1971, pages 6-8.

\*\* The April 1974 reorganization of the Council of Ministers is discussed in the TRENDS of 10 April 1974, pages 51-53.

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**MINISTERIAL REORGANIZATION** The reorganization of the two DRV ministries revealed in the National Assembly communiqué probably represents more a change in form than in actual responsibilities, since both of the ministers involved were named to positions that could have functions identical to their previous assignments.

Tan Quoc Hoan, the longtime head of the Ministry of Security, has been elected to lead the Ministry of Interior—the apparatus in communist states most often concerned with police functions. Duong Quoc Chinh, elected to head the newly organized Ministry of War Invalids and Social Affairs, was the previous minister of the Interior and, in that position, was publicly prominent in activities dealing with wounded military personnel. Thus, Chinh's new title appears to reflect official recognition of his actual responsibilities.

**OTHER CHANGES** Other positions dropped at the latest National Assembly election included that of Xuan Thuy, whose former post of minister without portfolio was not listed in the communiqué. The foreign relations committee of the National Assembly, which was created at the February 1974 Assembly session, is still chaired by Xuan Thuy, however. The list of ministers indicated that Vu Tuan, who has previously been identified in the media as vice minister of Light Industry, is now head of his ministry and has apparently replaced Kha Van Can. Dao Thien Thit, Tu Duy, and Vu Van Can, who were all formerly identified as acting heads of their organizations, were listed in the communiqué as minister of Finance, chairman of the state commission on prices, and minister of public health, respectively.

The National Defense Council has retained its same top leadership—with Ton Duc Thang and Phan Van Dong continuing to hold the chairmanship and vice chairmanship; but the Assembly communiqué revealed that Le Thanh Ngan has been added as a member and that Nguyen Gon and Tran Huu Duc have been dropped. Both Gon and Duc were relatively new members, having been elected in June 1971.

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## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

### MOSCOW RAPS PEKING SUPPORT FOR U.S. DEFENSE POLICIES

Moscow has reacted predictably to Peking's comment on U.S. policy in the wake of the communist victories in Indochina. Recent Soviet comment has accused Peking of attempting to foster increased defense efforts by the United States against Soviet interests in the rest of the world as the U.S. influence in Southeast Asia decreases. The Soviet comment has generally depicted a convergence of Sino-U.S. interests against the USSR, especially in Asia, but it has stopped short of suggesting direct connivance between the two powers. Moscow's current coverage of these developments appears designed primarily to further its longstanding campaign to discredit Peking's anti-imperialist credentials.

**SOVIET RESPONSE** A 4 June B. Krylov commentary in LITERATURAYA 10 PEKING focused on numerous recent SGINA articles favorably reporting U.S. defense moves as reflecting a Chinese "plan" to encourage U.S. defense efforts against Soviet interests in Europe and Asia. The article asserted toutinely that Peking's goal was to provoke renewed East-West conflict and scuttle detente. IZVESTIYA political observer V. Matveyev, speaking on Moscow radio's International observers roundtable program of 8 June, raised the possibility that Peking was attempting a "sort of global division of spheres of influence" in the wake of the U.S. Indochina pullback—"Southeast Asia and the Far East to Peking, Latin America and Western Europe to the United States." Matveyev went on to dismiss the possibility that such an arrangement was possible, however, and pointed to statements by U.S. officials that the U.S. intends to remain an Asian-Pacific power.

TRAVADA on 22 May replayed a TASS report on Secretary Schlesinger's remarks during an interview with U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, highlighting his comments on the post-Indochina situation and Sino-U.S. relations. It highlighted his comments that China desires to see U.S. forces remain in Asia, noting his statement that "the Chinese no longer consider the Americans as the main threat to their existence but see the United States as a useful counterbalance to the Soviet Union." More recently, a 6 June L. Sedov Moscow radio commentary in Japanese focused on PRC Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's recent remarks to U.S. journalists,

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reported in the U.S. press, which supported a continued U.S. military presence in Japan. The commentary also recalled press reports of remarks by other Chinese leaders expressing support for U.S. bases in Thailand and for the U.S. Indian Ocean base at Diego Garcia, concluding that the PRC's strong hostility toward the USSR had led it to "align itself completely with Washington on maintaining U.S. forces in various parts of Asia."

PEKING ON U.S. DEFENSE Peking media have followed their unusually full and favorable coverage of President Ford's European trip\* with a 7 June NCNA article reporting positively on the President's 4 June speech at West Point and on other recent statements by U.S. officials. The NCNA report highlighted President Ford's determination to "fight hard" to prevent U.S. defense spending cuts at a time when "our potential adversaries have increased their military budgets." The report depicted solid Congressional support for the Administration's defense plans, noting recent Senate votes against amendments calling for spending cuts and citing Senator Stennis to the effect that "the Senate feels that this is no time to weaken our defense posture." The article went on to report NATO Commander General Haig's recent remarks in a TIME interview concerning the need to increase U.S. attention to Europe and regarding the European sense of "relief" now that Washington has disengaged from Indochina. It also cited at length U.S. officials' statements in support of the U.S. base at Diego Garcia as a means to counter the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

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\* Peking's coverage of the President's trip is discussed in the TRENDS of 4 June 1975, pages 6-7; earlier Chinese media encouragement of U.S. defense efforts against Moscow is discussed in the TRENDS of 29 May 1975, pages 1-3.

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## PRC - PHILIPPINES

## PEKING, MANILA ESTABLISH RELATIONS DURING MARCOS VISIT

Peking has warmly welcomed the visiting Philippine delegation headed by President Ferdinand Marcos, with Premier Chou En-lai personally signing the 9 June communique formally establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries. Chinese rhetoric during the visit generally followed the pattern established during the May 1974 visit of Malaysian Prime Minister Razak, who was the first ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) leader to establish diplomatic relations with Peking. The visit also has provided the occasion for Peking's most authoritative warnings to date against alleged Moscow attempts to expand Soviet influence in Asia following the recent communist victories in Indochina.

President Marcos held separate talks with Chairman Mao and Premier Chou on 7 June, the day of his arrival in Peking, and he was feted that evening at a banquet hosted by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping. On 9 June Marcos hosted a farewell banquet, attended by Teng and other Chinese leaders, and witnessed the signing of a PRC-Philippine trade agreement.

Teng took the opportunity during his 7 June banquet speech to draw pointed attention to efforts by the Soviet Union to expand its power in Asia "by overt or covert means" at a time when the United States "has to withdraw after suffering defeat." Though avoiding specific reference to either superpower by name, Teng graphically underlined his case against the USSR in the wake of the U.S. Indochina defeat, warning his audience to guard against "letting the tiger in through the back door while repelling the wolf through the front gate." A similar theme had been sounded on the previous day at a reception honoring the visiting Australian foreign minister, when PRC Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua advised that "one superpower, taking advantage of the weakening and the strategic passivity of the other superpower, has sent its naval forces to the Pacific and Indian oceans to take a show of force and intimidate others."

As Chinese leaders had done during Razak's visit, Teng praised Southeast Asian efforts to create "a zone of peace and neutrality," but stopped short of direct endorsement. He did express firm support for the Southeast Asians' "just struggle against imperialism and hegemonism." As had the Sino-Malaysian communique on Razak's visit, the 9 June joint communique noted both sides' resolve to resist "any attempt by any country" to establish "hegemony" in any part of the world.

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On the delicate issue of support for insurgent movements, the Chinese followed virtually the same pattern as with Razak. In his 7 June banquet speech, Teng balanced a pledge of continued Chinese support for "oppressed peoples in their just struggles" with a commitment to normalize state relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence and not to interfere in Philippine internal affairs--sentiments similar to those expressed in Chou's welcoming speech for Razak last year. As in the joint communique with the Malaysians, the Sino-Philippine communique pledged both parties to oppose attempts at foreign "aggression," "subversion" and "control." The Sino-Philippine communique spelled out both sides' resolve to settle disputes without resorting to force and to respect each other's territorial integrity, clauses which may bear on their bilateral territorial dispute over the contested Spratley Islands. The Sino-Malaysian communique did not dwell on these issues.

On the Taiwan issue, the Philippines agreed in the communique that it "fully understands and respects" the PRC claim to the island--a phrase last used in the September 1972 Sino-Japanese communique establishing diplomatic relations. Malaysia last year had said that it "acknowledges" the PRC claim. Consistent with its policy for many years, Peking tried to defuse the issue of Overseas Chinese in the Philippines by agreeing in the communique that any citizen of either country who acquired citizenship in the other country would automatically forfeit his original citizenship.

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## KOREA

## KIM WINDS UP TOUR WITH VISITS TO BULGARIA, YUGOSLAVIA

DPRK President Kim Il-sung wound up his tour of East Europe and North Africa on 10 June, returning to Pyongyang from Belgrade. He had visited Romania from 22-26 May, was in Algeria and Mauritania from 26 May-2 June and then returned to East Europe, visiting Bulgaria from 2-5 June and closing out the tour in Yugoslavia.\* The trip seemed designed to emphasize and gain backing for North Korea's independent stance. Kim expressed interest in joining the nonaligned nations and reiterated DPRK identification with the Third World. The only close Soviet ally visited by Kim was Bulgaria, and the 5 June DPRK-Bulgarian communique suggested that substantial differences exist between the two sides.

**BULGARIA** As he had done during his previous stops, Kim carefully tailored his remarks in Bulgaria to his host's sensibilities, not raising such issues as DPRK insistence on independence and equality. Not once did Kim use the phrase "Third World," which has a distinctive Chinese flavor as used by Pyongyang. Bulgarian leader Zhivkov, on the other hand, showed less inclination to smooth over differences, and some of his remarks may have been aimed at the Korea-Romanian friendship treaty, signed by Kim in Bucharest in May, which had anti-Soviet overtones.

Like the communique issued following Zhivkov's visit to Pyongyang in October 1973, the 5 June joint communique failed to paper over substantial differences separating the two sides, failing to mention unanimity or an identity of views. The communique characterized the atmosphere of the talks as one of "fraternal friendship and comradely trust," a decidedly chilly formulation for such an occasion. In the communique both sides expressed readiness to further develop party "relations and cooperation."

**DETENTE:** As in 1973, Korean and Bulgarian differences over detente surfaced in speeches by Kim and Zhivkov. Though on this visit Kim was considerably more restrained in his criticism of detente policies, at a 5 June rally he cautioned that as their

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\* Kim's previous stops during his tour were discussed in the TRENDS of 29 May, pages 15-18, and 4 June, pages 17-19.

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situation becomes more difficult, imperialists "resort to placatory and deceptive tricks in an attempt to find a way out." (In his speeches in Romania last month Kim sounded no such caution, even though Ceausescu had spoken favorably of detente.)

In both of his major speeches during the visit, on the 2d and 5th, Zhivkov referred to the European security conference. Kim did not mention Korean support for Bulgarian efforts at "securing peace and security in Europe," support that he had included in his speeches in 1973, though the communique again noted Korean support for such efforts. The current communique did not, however, also cite "positive results" in this regard, as both sides had done in 1973.

SOCIALIST UNITY: Differences between Pyongyang and Sofia on the question of socialist unity and cooperation were readily apparent. In the communique both sides merely "noted" the necessity of strengthening "unity" among the socialist countries and communist and workers' parties, while in 1973 the two sides had expressed their "determination" to strengthen not only unity but also "cohesion and mutual cooperation" as well. Kim made clear the DPRK's insistence that Marxism-Leninism must be creatively applied to the "specific conditions" of Korea, but unlike in 1973 he did not directly refer to Korean insistence on independence as a condition for achieving cohesion among socialist countries. In his speeches on 2 and 5 June Kim offered the standard Pyongyang formulation that each country contributes to the world revolution by successfully carrying out its own socialist construction. In his 2 June speech Kim made a nonstandard addition, stating that socialist countries "hasten the victory of the common cause by supporting and cooperating with each other."

At the rally on the 5th Zhivkov issued a strong call for communist ideological unity and stated that the communist movement must be protected from any "dissident elements, from the attempts of confining individual communist parties to the narrow framework of national boundaries." The solution to tasks facing the communist movement, Zhivkov said, "can and must be solved not only by the individual, but also by the collective efforts of all fraternal parties." Pyongyang radio carried Zhivkov's speech, but the KCNA press agency did not, though it carried Kim's speech on the occasion. This was the only time during Kim's entire tour that KCNA failed to transmit a speech by the host leader when fully reporting Kim's remarks.

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Zhivkov's warnings about confining communist parties to national boundaries and his exhortation for "collective efforts" were probably aimed at Romania and Yugoslavia as well as Korea. Zhivkov referred to the "coming conference of the communist and workers parties of the European countries"--as prospective participants in the conference, both the Romanians and the Yugoslavs have recently resisted Soviet bloc efforts to secure advance approval of a Moscow-oriented draft conference document. In a 2 June banquet speech Zhivkov seemed to reply to implicit criticism of the Warsaw Pact in the Korean-Romanian friendship treaty signed during Kim's visit to Bucharest. He stated that the Bulgarians are "rightfully proud of our close political, economic, and defensive cooperation with member countries of the Warsaw Treaty."

KOREAN SITUATION: Kim did not mention Northern support for the "struggle" of the South Korean people in his speeches in Bulgaria, nor did he note increased tension or the possibility of war on the peninsula. In his rally speech on the 5th, Kim merely stated that "socialist revolution" and "socialist construction" in the North "contribute to the common cause of the people by curbing the imperialist maneuver to use force and start a war in the East." He did not allude to the North-South dialog or mention any specific Northern proposals for peaceful reunification. Kim's only mention of the presence of foreign troops in Korea came in his 2 June banquet speech, when he noted Bulgarian demands for the "withdrawal of all foreign troops present in South Korea under the cloak of the 'UN forces'." Kim also noted Bulgarian opposition to the "two Koreas plot of imperialism and its lackeys."

Zhivkov, in his 2 June speech, called the presence of foreign troops in South Korea "a constant source of tension" posing a "grave threat to peace" in the region. In his speech on the 5th he supported Kim's June 1973 five-point plan and demanded the "immediate withdrawal" of foreign troops under the "UN emblem." These points were repeated by the Bulgarians in the communique, along with denunciations of the "imperialists and Pak Chong-hui puppet clique" for creating "two Koreas." In the only public mention by either side of DPRK efforts seeking UN action on the Korean question, Zhivkov noted that the North was gaining support "within the United Nations" for its "peaceful program on reunification."

YUGOSLAVIA Kim's visit to Yugoslavia was marked by both sides' agreement on the need for "independence" and "equality" as the basis for relations. The talks seem to have been devoted

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primarily to discussions of North Korea's bid to join the nonaligned movement. Despite unspecified differences, noted implicitly by President Tito in his speeches on 7 and 9 June and explicitly referred to in a 7 June TANJUG item, the emphasis was on agreement. The 10 June joint communique held that the two sides had reached a "unanimity of views" in talks held in an atmosphere of "friendship, mutual respect, and understanding."

In his speech on the 6th Tito expressed support for the "endeavors of the DPRK to participate fully in the activity of the nonaligned countries," and on the 7th he noted that Yugoslavia believed the DPRK would "have a place" in the upcoming Colombo meeting of nonaligned nations. As he had in Algeria on 28 May, Kim noted in his 6 June speech that nonalignment was uniting countries "with differing social systems," and that the policy of nonalignment was "in line with independent home and foreign policies" pursued by the DPRK. The Yugoslavs echoed that point in the communique, which also noted satisfaction by both sides with the decision of the March 1975 Havana meeting of the coordinating bureau of nonaligned states recommending admission of the DPRK to the movement "as a member with full rights."

Neither side accorded much public discussion to the Korean situation; Kim did not mention it at all in any of his speeches in Yugoslavia. In his speech on the 6th, Tito offered support for Kim's five-point proposal and called for the withdrawal from the South of foreign troops, "whose presence is a menace to peace." At a mass meeting on the 9th Tito noted that Yugoslavia would extend "full support on the international plane" for Korean efforts to reunify Korea, but he did not elaborate. In the communique the Yugoslav side offered its support for Kim's three principles and five points, called for the withdrawal from South Korea of foreign troops under the UN flag "without delay," and denounced the "two Koreas plot of the imperialists and the South Korean rulers."

In the communique the two sides held that "foreign military bases in others' territories must be completely removed, and all foreign troops be withdrawn from other countries," language identical to that used in the DPRK-Romanian friendship treaty and in the 28 May DPRK-Romanian communique. The communique, however, did not call for dissolving "military blocs," as had the DPRK-Romanian documents. In neither Tito's speeches nor the communique did Belgrade mention the European security conference.

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## CPSU-NETHERLANDS CP

## PARTY OFFICIALS HOLD TALKS PRIOR TO NETHERLANDS PARTY CONGRESS

Soviet media accounts of a recent visit by a CPSU delegation to the small and independent-minded Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN), on the eve of the CPN's congress, suggest there was little progress in ironing out differences, although the evidence is ambiguous. The Moscow delegation's visit was part of CPSU efforts to establish at least a working relationship with all the maverick West European communist parties,\* while intensive negotiations continue among European communist parties to prepare for convening the European CP conference. Leading the CPSU delegation visiting the CPN, which has boycotted preparations for the European CP conference, was Vadim Zagladin, a leading expert on the West European communist movement and a deputy to Politburo member Boris Ponomarev on the CPSU Central Committee's International Section.

The CPSU visit, reported by PRAVDA on 3 June, seemed timed to precede the CPN's 25th Congress held 6-8 June in an apparent effort to sort out differences before the CPN congress issued its documents. PRAVDA's account of Zagladin's meeting with former CPN chairman Paul De Groot and current party leader Hank Hoeckstra suggests that little progress was made toward better CPSU-CPN relations, which in recent years have been marked by vituperative exchanges in party publications and strident public statements by the Netherlands CP leaders.\*\* PRAVDA acknowledged that there was an exchange of opinions on issues relating "to the forms and the substance" of CPSU-CPN relations "in the past and at the present and also to the potential for developing these relations in a positive spirit." The account added that the representatives of the two parties "agreed to report to their party central committees on the discussions held and the proposals advanced" during their meetings.

\* CPSU differences with the Spanish CP, led by Santiago Carrillo, were papered over in October 1974 on the eve of the Warsaw consultative meeting of European CP's.

\*\* CPSU-CPN relations prior to and after the 24th CPN congress--including an authoritative PRAVDA Observer article--are discussed in the TRENDS of 17 May 1972, pages 36-39, and 19 July 1972, pages 39-41.

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It is unclear from Soviet accounts whether the Zagladin delegation was present at the CPN congress; the CPN did not invite foreign delegations to the 24th congress in 1972, nor even acknowledge foreign greetings messages. Like the CPSU message in 1972, this year's CPSU greetings to the CPN congress, published in PRAVDA on the 6th, wished the CPN success in uniting the party's ranks "on the basis of the tested principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism." The current message did not repeat a 1972 call for the "development of ties with friendly communist parties." This omission could be construed as evidence that there were now some slight prospects for improved relations, making such a call no longer necessary. TASS on the 9th, reporting the 25th congress, favorably cited De Groot's report on the international situation as allegedly condemning "anti-Sovietism."

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## PANAMA

### CUBA, USSR, PRC SUPPORT TORRIJOS REGIME ON CANAL NEGOTIATIONS

Recent efforts by Panamanian head of government Gen. Omar Torrijos to obtain backing for his position on canal negotiations--described by Panama as at an "impasse"--have drawn routine expressions of support from Havana, Moscow and Peking. The statements are in line with the generally favorable Cuban and Soviet treatment of the nationalist Torrijos regime since it assumed power in a 1968 coup, and may also reflect Havana's and Moscow's satisfaction with Panamanian efforts in support of a lifting of the Cuban blockade.

HAVANA In a 6 June account of a meeting between Fidel Castro and a Panamanian delegation visiting Cuba to discuss the status of canal negotiations, PRENSA LATINA reported the delegation head as saying that Castro had "reaffirmed the support of the Cuban revolution" for the Panamanian people's "anti-imperialist and nationalist struggle" for jurisdiction over the canal zone. Castro had previously declared, in a 26 August 1974 interview following Panama's resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba, that he saw "no reason to set a limit" to Cuba's support for Panama, and affirmed that Cuba would offer political, moral and economic backing and "any other kind of backing that is needed."

While Cuban media have been unwavering in their backing on the canal issue, Havana has not as yet extended any public Cuban expression of support for a Panamanian seat on the UN Security Council, which Panama has been seeking in a recent series of high-level delegation visits to Latin capitals. Illustrative of earlier Cuban backing on the canal question was an 8 January "Our America" commentary marking a solidarity week on the occasion of the 11th anniversary of the 1964 U.S.-Panamanian clash in the Canal Zone. The commentary hailed Panama's efforts to end "imperialist domination" and declared that Cuba and "most of the governments of the world" stood behind the 1973 Security Council resolution recognizing Panama's right to sovereignty over all its territory.\*

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\* Panama's resumption of relations with Cuba is discussed in the TRENDS of 28 August 1974, pages 16-17. Comment on the 1973 Security Council meeting in Panama is discussed in the 14 March 1973 TRENDS, pages 23-24.

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**MOSCOW, PEKING** Moscow, which also supported the 1973 Security Council resolution, has from time to time proffered support for a new canal treaty. Soviet media recently took note of the status of the canal negotiations in coverage of the 8-19 May OAS general assembly, which passed a resolution encouraging the swift conclusion of U.S.-Panamanian negotiations leading to a new treaty. Thus, PRAVDA on 21 May reported that Latin countries had "forced" Washington to agree that the "shackling U.S.-Panama treaty on the Panama Canal" must be replaced. And a participant in Moscow radio's roundtable program on 25 May remarked that Latin America had been united in their view of the need for revision of the "one-sided U.S.-Panamanian Treaty." Moscow previously has had praise for both the Torrijos regime and Panama's canal position. For example, a 12 October 1974 Moscow radio commentary on the 6th anniversary of the Torrijos regime noted that Gen. Torrijos' assumption of power "has meant so much for the country and its people" and approved the "great changes" made in Panama's foreign and domestic policies during his tenure. Along the same lines, a 3 November 1974 Moscow domestic radio report of an interview with Ruben Darío Souza, secretary general of the Soviet-supported Panamanian People's Party, noted Darío Souza's praise of the "fresh impulse" which Torrijos had given to the "years of struggle" over the canal zone, and reported the communist leader's remark that "we Panamanian communists support the government of General Torrijos."

Although Peking's recent coverage of the canal issue has been largely confined to replaying Panamanian statements, a lengthy 6 June NCNA report on the issue concluded that "the United States has refused seriously to hold talks with Panama" since agreeing to the February 1974 declaration of principles on which a new treaty would be based. Asserting that the "patriotic anti-U.S. mass struggle" of 1964 had "compelled" the United States to begin talks and that "strong pressure of the world people" led to the conclusion of principles, NCNA claimed that the United States now refused to continue negotiations because of a dispute over military bases which Washington wanted to maintain "under the pretext of 'defending the canal.'" The article lauded the "vigorous struggle" waged by General Torrijos, pointing to Latin and Third World support for the "abrogation of the unjustifiable 1903 treaty and Panama's exercise of full sovereignty over the canal and the canal zone."

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## USSR

## RUSSIAN SECOND SECRETARIES REPLACED IN 3 CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS

The replacement of the Russian second secretaries in three of the four Central Asian republics within the space of six weeks suggests a quiet tightening up is underway. Two of the new second secretaries are specialists on nationalities sent from Moscow, where they headed CPSU Central Committee sectors dealing with cadres in non-Russian republics. These changes are clearly Moscow decisions, since the post of second secretary in these republics is traditionally reserved for a Russian, who acts as Moscow's watchdog over the non-Russian republic leaders.

The first change occurred on 14 April, when V.I. Pereudin replaced V.S. Rykov as second secretary in Turkmenia. This was followed by the 25 April replacement of Kirgiz Second Secretary N.N. Tattyshov with Yu.S. Pugachev, and the 24 May replacement of Tadzhik Second Secretary A.I. Shitev with Yu.I. Polukarov.

Of the new secretaries, Pugachev is the most interesting and perhaps most ominous. From secretary of Astrakhan oblast in the late 1960's, he became head of a sector in the Central Committee party organizational work section by late 1971. Since virtually all his 15 appearances in this capacity from 1971-75 were in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, his sector clearly handled Transcaucasian affairs. Thus, he was heavily involved in supervising the massive purges at that time in Georgia and Armenia. Most recently he supervised a 14 April Georgian Central Committee plenum which fired Georgian Second Secretary V.N. Churkin for unspecified corruption.

Polukarov rose from chief engineer at the Vladimir tractor plant in the 1950's to Vladimir city first secretary in the mid-1960's, and by early 1970 he had become head of a sector of the Central Committee's party organizational work section. His infrequent appearances as sector head were in Uzbekistan and Kirgizia, suggesting that his sector was responsible for Central Asian republics.

Pereudin, unlike the others who were newcomers to their republics, has been in Turkmenia for at least 20 years. He was head of the Turkmen Central Committee party organizational work section from 1967 to 1972 and since then has been chairman of the republic people's control committee.

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There have been no public campaigns against nationalism or corruption in Central Asia recently which would account for the dispatch of new Russian watchdogs. Paradoxically, it may be the relative stability of the local leaderships in these republics which has prompted Moscow's action. Tadzhik First Secretary Rasulov and Kirgiz First Secretary Usubaliev have both held their posts for more than 14 years--a length of tenure unprecedented in these republics. Moscow may have felt that a reassessment of central control was necessary to prevent the local leaderships from becoming too self-assured. This would explain also why a local Russian, rather than one sent from Moscow, was promoted to second secretary in Turkmenia, where the first secretary, Gapurov, has been in his job only since 1969.

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## NOTE

PRC PHONETIC ALPHABET: On 31 May SCIA's domestic service in Chinese transmitted a State Council announcement and a separate report stating that after 1 September all Chinese foreign-language documents would render Chinese names according to the Chinese phonetic system (pinyin). Some 14 hours after the items were carried the same SCIA service message asked all recipients to hold the items "for the time being." As far as can be determined, the announcement is still being held. It is not unusual for SCIA to ask recipients to hold an item, but usually the embargo period is much shorter. No other PRC source has reported the planned conversion.

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## APPENDIX

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 2 - 8 JUNE 1975

<u>Moscow (2736 items)</u>	<u>Peking (859 items)</u>
Upcoming Union Republic Supreme Soviet Elections (10%) 17%	Philippine President Marcos in PRC (--) 9%
[Soviet Leaders' Election Speeches (--) 11%]	Vietnam (--) 5%
Vietnam (1%) 12%	[PRC 6th Anniversary (--) 3%]
[Soviet Messages to DRV Leaders on National Assembly Election (--) 7%]	DPRK's Kim Il-sung in North Africa (11%) 4%
[Soviet Greetings etc PRG 6th Anniversary (--) 4%]	USSR-Egyptian Differences (3%) 4%
China (6%) 5%	Australian Foreign Minister in PRC (--) 3%
Suez Canal Reopening (--) 2%	Nuclear Nonproliferation Meeting, Geneva (--) 3%
	Taiwan (1%) 3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.